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The Wood Inquiry
Special Branch-the future?
Mark Findlay
This article ties together the Wood Report dealing with the three Ananda Marga members convicted
for conspiring to murder Robert Cameron, leader of the National Front in 1978 with the operation of
the State Special Branches and ASIO.
In May 1985 Mr Justice Wood submitted his report of
the Inquiry (under s.475 of the Crimes Act (NSW) held
into the convictions of Timothy Anderson, Paul Alister
and Ross Dunn. 1 The Government responded to the
report by immediately issuing pardons for all three.
Along with the questions concerning the guilt of
Anderson, Alister and Dunn, the Inquiry dealt with the
conduct of the NSW Special Branch, officers of which
were principal witnesses against the three in their trials.
Weeks of the Inquiry were occupied with evidence con.
cerning the nature and reliability of the Branch's infor-
mant, Richard Scary. Various taped conversations be-
tween Scary and the Branch officers were analysed in
detail. The links between ASIO and Special Branch
during the period after the Hilton bombing were exam-
ined, as were the activities of individual Branch officers,
At the end the judge was invited to make a variety of
findings on the operations of Special Branch which
might have greatly influenced the Government's decis-
ion as to whether it should follow other Labor States
(most recently WA, Victoria and SA) in disbanding or
radically restructuring their Special Branches. In par-
ticular, he was invited to make determinations on:
* the propriety of the Branch in recruiting and using
Scary;
" the integrity of the tape-recorded interviews be-
tween Scary and Branch officers;
* whether there had been any 'cover up' or suppression
of material from these tapes;
* whether the Branch's claim for privilege on the basis
of national security was justified and whether there
had been a conspiracy to withhold relevant evidence
from the accused; and
" why the traditional relationship between Special
Branch and ASIO (of the almost automatic inter-
change of information) should have been reversed in
this case.
SEARY - ON WHOM THE CASE TURNED
Mr Justice Wood reported to the Government that he
was satisifed that the police acted bona fide in the re-
cruitment and subsequent handling of their agent,
Richard Scary, although he said that more positive vet-
ting of his intelligence by Special Branch and more care-
ful surveillance of him by the police on the day of the
arrest of Alister, Anderson and Dunn should have taken
place. The judge was satisfied further that Scary was
never induced by any police officer to fabricate the in-
formation and evidence he gave about the 'lHilton
bombing' or the alleged crimes of the three on 15 June
1978. lie directed blame for the , ;itriving of evidence
onto Scary himself.
lie posed two alternatives concerning Seary's role in
the construction of the case. Were the three men and the
police carefully manoeuvred into position by Scary and
the central facts skilfully manipulated by him? Or did
Scary, convinced of the Petitioners' guilt, yet fearful
that the Crown case might not be watertight, embellish
and fill in the areas where he suspected problems might
arise? The judge said that he inclined to the latter view,
but that the first alternative could not be excluded.
This he said, must colour the remainder of the evidence,
and only one conclusion was possible. 'Doubts exist
both concerning the reliability and accuracy of Scary's
evidence, and as to the convictions of the Petitioners on
all counts.'
Deputy Commissioner of Police, John Perrin, went on
ABC TV following publication of the Wood Report and,
surprisingly in the light of evidence, reaffirmed his belief
in Seary's reliability. As Inspector Perrin he was head of
Special Branch between 1 January 1976 and 1 December
1979. It was Perrin who authorised Scary's use as an
agent but they did not meet until months after Scary
had commenced workliig for the police. lie agreed that
the use of agents had to be carefully supervised and con-
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trolled because an informer might compromise an inves-
tigation and subsequent prosecution. But he did not
carry out that supervision and control himself.
Constable Krawczyk, who was Seary's 'agent master',
indicated to counsel for the Margiis that he considered
the information supplied by Scary was reliable. This
seems incredible when Krawczyk had worked so closely
with the man for months.
WHY DID SPECIAL BRANCH TARGET
THE MARGIIS?
Most of the offences dealt with by Special Branch in
Perrin's time involved street offences arising out of dem-
onstrations. They had not prosecuted anyone for a
major crime before Alister, Anderson and Dunn.
The Branch, as a unit of the police force, had four
general areas of operation: civil disorder within NSW,
the activities of factions within ethnic communities,
the provision of security escorts for VIPs and the trans-
mission to ASIO through the Commissioner of Police
of information which appeared to be of national secur-
ity interest gathered during the course of its other func-
tions. However, Perrin did not recall ever being instruc-
ted on the criteria for determining whether information
was of national security interest. He said the practice
developed whereby lie referred information to ASIO
directly without channelling it through the Commis-
sioner of Police. He said that he personally decided
which individuals and organisations would be targetted.
For some time before tile Hilton bombing and
Scary's recruitment Special Branch had been interested
in the Ananda Marga. Following the abduction of the
Indian military attache by a member of the Ananda
Marga in Canberra in 1977, the NSW Special Branch
began a running sheet on the sect. ASIO and the Indian
Consulate supplied the Branch with a mass of informa-
tion about them.
No terrorist group claimed responsibility for the
Hilton bombing. Scary at first directed suspicion to-
wards the Hare Krishna sect; however, within a short
time of his initial contact with the police he was re-
cruited by Special Branch and turned away from the
Hare Krishnas towards the Ananda Marga. Why this
happened was not entirely explained. During a confer-
ence between ASIO and Special Branch, ASIO indica-
ted that the Margiis were a 'soft target'. Yet the Branch
persisted in their interest and in Krawczyk's words
'chased it up and proved them [ASIQ] wrong'.
RECRUITMENT OF SEARY
The judge found that some uncertainty surrounded the
recruitment of Scary. The inquiries made about him,
prior to and during his employment by the police, were
confined to a perusal of his fingerprint record and an
oral clearance from ASIO that it had no adverse infor-
mation in relation to him. He was recruited with little
investigation into his background, even though it was
known that he once abused drugs and that he had
adopted a nomadic and fringe lifestyle. Further informa-
tion about him could have been obtained, according to
the Wood Report, from court files and from the records
of the Adult Probation Service. This inquiry would have
provided the professional assessment of him by Dr Nur-
combe (prison psychiatrist), Dr Dalton (a specialist in
drug rehabilitation), Mrs Burgoyne (a social worker)
and Mr Cossins (a probation officer). Dr Nurcombe had
concluded that Scary had severe personality defects and
was likely to take drugs again if he remained in Sydney.
Dr Dalton's view was that afthough Seary's drug addic-
tion was not a major problem, it could become so if it
remained untreated. Scary had described himself to
Mr Cossins as 'slightly schizophrenic'. To Mrs Burgoyne,
he had given an alarming history of prolonged drug
abuse (including cocaine, LSD, heroin, opium and
amphetamines), which Mrs Burgoyne had systematically
recorded. She doubted the truth of much of what Scary
had told her, noting him as 'bland, schizoid'. The judge
said that he regarded Mrs Burgoyne as a witness of
truth.
Although these inquiries weren't made, Special
Branch officers knew that Scary was being treated at
the Queen Elizabeth 1I Rehabilitation Centre as they left
material for him there. More importantly they inter-
viewed Dr Voss (a specialist in rehabilitation) who was
treating Scary at the time. Dr Voss gave evidence that
Scary exhibited a personality disorder with schizoid
traits. Within a week of meeting the Special Branch
officers and agreeing to infiltrate the Ananda Marga,
Scary sought referral to a psychiatrist at the rehabili-
tation centre. Dr Fischer, a consultant psychiatrist who
saw him then, expressed the conclusion that Scary had
a personality disorder and was rather schizoid. This sits
,'nhappily with the Branch's duty to employ truthful,
responsible and reliable agents.
It was suggested to Krawczyk by counsel for the
Margiis that one of the reasons for Scary's role as an
agent being kept secret from ASIO was the concern that
Scary might easily be shown by ASIO to be 'crazy and
unreliable'. Krawczyk denied this and even suggested
that he didn't consider that ASIO or the Commonwealth
Police could assist the Branch in assessing the reliability
of their agent. This is an extraordinary view in light of
the complementary roles played in past ASIO-Branch
association. The real reason would appear to have been,
according to Special Branch officers, their fear that
ASIO would steal Scary away to use as their own agent.
Whatever the reason, Special Branch kept Scary's exis-
tence secret from ASIO; in fact it was clear from evi-
dence given at the Inquiry that ASIO was unaware that
Scary was a Branch agent until he gave evidence at the
committal.
The judge said that it was of some concern that
Scary was recruited and infiltrated into the sect so
quickly.
There was a risk of his being a counter-agent whose
task was either to provide disinformation covering
the Ananda Marga Sect, and/or to acquire intelli-
gence concerning police operations against it. Either
way he might have compromised investigations into
the Sect and the Hilton Bombing. Further, he was
placed into position without any guidance or train-
ing, even though current intelligence suggested his
undercover assignment might be extremely hazard-
ous. So far as the Police were concerned, they were
dealing with a terrorist group which was suspected of
one of the most serious acts of violence in the crim-
inal history of the State, and which was also sus-
pected of dealing harshly with defectors and inform-
ers.
The judge also reported areas of concern in relation
to the events of 15 June 1978 (the day of the arrest at
Yagoona). Most significantly Scary was allowed to r ,main
unobserved by police between 9 p.m. and I1 p.m. that
day. During this time it was his responsibility to collect
a car and drive to the Carillon Avenue 'pickup'. Had he
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been watched by police during this period, no question
could have remained as to whether it was he who took
the bomb to Newtown and how he came by the car used
to drive to Yagoona. He had told Krawczyk on a num-
ber of occasions that he had been told by the Margiis to
steal a car, but made no mention of this to Inspector
Perrin when closely questioned about it. Doubts about
the guilt of the accused could also have been removed
by the use of a car fitted with recording or listening
equipment. It is surprising that the facilities and exper-
tise of the Police Electronics Unit were not employed.
The judge conclude I: 'while ... no significant criti-
cism of the handling ol Scary before and including the
15th of June is justified, there were areas which were
left in shadow'.
THE INTEGRITY OF THE TAPES AND
TRANSCRIPTS
It was submitted by counsel for the Margiis and by
counsel assisting the judge that the integrity of the
police tapes of their debriefings with Seary was critical.
Evidence about the tapes was given by Mr Craig (a con-
sultant engineer for Lewis A. Challiss and Associates).
He found anomalies in a number of them. In his view
there was no doubt that tape 9 had been crudely edited
by rewinding and overdubbing. In the course of the
Crown address no attack was made on the qualifications
of Mr Craig to give his evidence or on his conclusions.
There was no other expert evidence called on the
tapes. Despite the uncontradicted evidence the Wood
Report concluded that although there were some 'curious
aspects shown to exist in relation to the tapes, they are
insufficient to leave me with any real doubt as to their
authenticity, or to cause me to suspect the involvement
of the police in any unlawful conspiracy'. A strange con-
clusion indeed!
The judge noted, however, that a number of the tapes
were incorrectly dated and sequenced. The work was
carried out by Special Branch, but he said he could not
attribute responsibility for the errors to any one person.
He concluded that the Petitioners should have been
allowed access, before or during the first trial, to much
of the material given by Seary to the police. They were
only given access to a transcript of tape 9, recorded on
the day of their arrest, and a heavily edited version of
tape 6, recorded some days before.
The editing of tape 6 was ostensibly carried out on
the grounds of national security, but edited out of the
version supplied to the Petitioners was a reference to
Seary's access to the typewriter in the offices of the
Ananda Marga upon which the Crown alleged letters
incriminating the accused were typed. This was of great
importance to the defence and could have nothing to
do with national security. Portions of tape 6A were of
considerable relevance to the charges before the court as
they recorded discussion speculating on what might be
planned for the National Front leader, as well as evi-
dence of Seary's knowledge of and experience with
explosives, which was critical to the defence.
In relation to the editing of tape 6 the judge reported:
'No witness acknowledged responsibility for this task ...
I think it most improbable . . . that the task would have
been carried out by a police officer without some assis-
tance from Mr Forbes [Deputy Crown Solicitor] '. The
judge however, ignored the consequences of those find-
ings. Why was material of relevance to the defence
edited out of transcripts by the police and the Deputy
Crown Solicitor, when it had not the slightest connec-
tion with national security? In evidence to the Inquiry,
Mr Forbes agreed that he had not heard of any of the
tapes, nor read any of the transcripts in full before
forming his opinion that they contained matters per-
taining to national security. He had not discussed the
detail of the Crown case or the defence with the Crown
Prosecutor before advising on the claim for immunity.
The judge said that he had no doubt that senior
police officers honestly believed Special Branch should
protect its records from public disclosure. It was the
judge's view however, that documents concerning
Seary's initial contact with police, his allegations impli-
cating the Hare Krishna movement in the Hilton bomb-
ing, his knowledge of explosives, his access to the
Ananda Marga typewriter, his involvement in an earlier
plot to bomb the Homebush abattoirs and the circum-
stances in which Anderson asked Scary to find Cameron's
(the National Front leader's) address, were all matters
relevant to issues raised in the trial. None of them had
the slightest connection with national security.
CONCLUSION
Justice Wood said that he was satisfied that on his exam-
ination of the evidence and documents produced, no
question arose as to the existence of a conspiracy be-
tween police officers and Scary and there was nothing
sinister in the way that the tapes and transcripts of the
Scary debriefings were handled. He made little of the
apparent question of whether, because of his character
and past history, the police could have actually believed
the evidence presented by Scary. He said nothing about
the propriety of using such a man as an agent.
Despite the judge's reluctance to make adverse com-
ments on the nature of the police evidence and the oper-
ation of the Branch in this affair, logic must draw one to
this critical conclusion. If there is some doubt as to the
guilt of Alister, Anderson and Dunn then in turn there
must be some doubt as to the case against them. If such
a doubt exists, it must come from the evidence on which
that case was substantially based. On even the most gen-
erous reading of the evidence of Special Branch officers
and Scary it is apparent that if the truth of that evidence
is in question then certain presenters of that evidence
may have conspired in its presentation. In relation to the
admissions alleged to have been made by the three, the
judge reported: 'the doubt that attaches to oral admis-
sions, well recognised by the courts and judicial en-
quiries, remains, and nothing was proven before me to
dispel or lessen the reservations that must attach to this
form of evidence by its very nature'.
The shadows are dense indeed as to sonic of the ac-
tivities of the Special Branch and its officers in this case.
Important questions for the Minister of Police and the
Government are:
* In the light of the Branch's record for the 'successful'
prosecution of crime is its continuation in any form
justified?
" How did Special Branch officers wrongly date and
sequence the tapes?
" How did Special Branch officers come to overlook
the transcription of all the tapes?
* Why was material of great relevance to the defence
case edited out of a transcript ostensibly on the
grounds of national security?
* Why was Seary's background not fully investigated
by the police?
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* Why was his existence and his 'intelligence' concealed
from ASIO?
" Why did the head of Special Branch adopt tile prac-
tice of communicating with ASIO otherwise than
through the Commissioner of Police?
* Why did Deputy Commissioner Perrin go on televis-
ion after Mr Justice Wood reported that Scary was
not reliable, and suggest that he (Perrin) regarded
Seary as reliable?
Despite the answers suggested to these questions by
various witnesses and Mr Justice Wood the Government's
responsibility for Special Branch requires that it gets its
own answers and act so that no further doubts about
the guilt of people sent to prison can arise. Specifically
arising out of this unique insight into police 'intelligence'
practice is the question of how a police unit such as
Special Branch could possess the structured freedom to
orchestrate an investigation in such a manner. Finally, it
is essential to question what motivates a police unit like
Special Branch and how their operational goals conflict
with the non-partisan ideology of civil policing. When
police operational practice strays into considerations of
state 'subversion' and political order, the reality of the
political, class-based origin of policing and their integra-
tion into the wider political superstructure of the state
becomes most clear.
HISTORY OF PREVIOUS INQUIRY INTO
THE SPECIA L BRANCH
In November 1977 the Dunstan Labor Government in
South Australia appointed the then Mr Acting Justice
White of the State Supreme Court to investigate and
report on the functions of their 'Special Branch'. The
Government suspected that the Branch was far from sat-
isfactorily accountable to it and that controls over rec-
ords kept by the Branch were insufficient. In December
1977 White presented a report 2 which-was extremely
critical of the Branch's activities. Of their record-keeping
practices he said 'Material which I know to be inaccur-
ate and sometimes scandalously inaccurate appears in
some dossiers and on some cards'. 3 He went on to criti-
cise the Branch for 'tile cost and waste involved in tile
mindless collection of masses of useless information
based on false and unjust premises.' 4 On the question of
accountability, his views were well summarised in the
covering letter which accompanied the report. 'The
Special Branch believed that it owed a greater loyalty
to itself and its own concept of security, than to the
Government, '5
The White Report was also critical of the connection
between the Special Branch of a State police force and
ASIO. This criticism centred on the nature and quality
of the information exchanged between these two organi-
sations, the regular and free flow of such information
and the absence of any satisfactory structure to ensure
that such exchange was always monitored by the State
Government. In fact White recognised the development
of a service/client relationship between ASIO and the
Branch. The historical origins of State Special Branches
makes such a relationship intended and unavoidable. 6
This is what makes the reluctance of the NSW Special
Branch to 'share' Scary with ASIO all the more remark-
able.
Earlier in 1977, Mr Justice Hope had completed his
final report7 for the first Royal Commission on Intelli-
gence and Security in Australia. lie made the following
recommendations:
.. . the relationship has been based on arrange-
ments of a rather informal kind made between
A.S.I.O. and each police force; the arrangements
have not been made between the Commonwealth
Government and the relevant State Government.
Sometimes it has appeared that a State Government
is not aware, either of the details of operations or
intelligence communicated or even the nature of
the arrangements made between A.S.I.O. and its
own police force. The relationship should be regu-
lated by arrangements made at government level.
From their inception the various State Special Branches
have been cloaked in secrecy. Before the White Report,
there had been no public exposure of their workings
anywhere in Australia. Since then only NSW has subjec.
ted its Special Branch to limited public scrutiny. In Jan-
uary 1978 Premier Wran instructed the NSW Privacy
Committee to inquire into the record-keeping practices
of the NSW Special Branch. 8 An examination of the
information on file at the Branch showed that the exter-
nal influence of ASIO not only affected the nature and
emphasis of the data, but also controlled the relevance
accorded such information by the Branch. This in turn
affected both the continued data collection networks of
the Branch, and the direction of its limited analysis.
In July 1983 the Chief Commissioner of Police in
Victoria announced that his Special Branch was to be
disbanded. Its responsiblities were to be rationalised
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and a new police unit would be responsible for the
collection, collation and dissemination of 'intelligence'
on anti-terrorist incidents, and 'to gather information
which may lead to violence between groups in the
country'. At first blush this might appear to be 'a rose
by any other name'. However, the difference between
the Victorian Special Branch as it was and this new unit,
is that the re-organised Branch should only concern
itself with incidents, individuals and organisations
which have a clearly recognisable potential for violence
and terrorism. This is a considerable circumscription of
the former Branch's interests, towards more traditional
police concerns.
Soon after, Western Australia disbanded its Special
Branch and a new unit was established within its force
for the coverage of VIP protection and counter-terrorist
intelligence. In 1984 South Australian Attorney-General
Sumner announced that the Special Branch in that
State would be disbanded. lie indicated the importance
of the distinction between acts or threats of violence to
the individual or the nation and its institutions (which
are clearly the legitimate subject of police action) and
political dissent and activity (which is not). He admitted
that while there 'are some grey areas which are not easy
to define, we should stait from the assumption that indi-
viduals or groups operating openly in the democratic
process, should not be the subject of attention by sec-
urity organisations'. 10
Mr Sumner was strongly critical of the Branch, par-
ticularly their lack of accountability to the Government
and the fact that information could be made available
to ASIO and other Special Branches without Ministerial
approval. With the disbanding of Special Branch, those
'legitimate and important'll security activities will be
carried on by the SA police force.
INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE BETWEEN
ASIO AND THE NSW SPECIAL BRANCH
There appears to have always been some divergence be-
tween the formal process of intelligence exchange
between these two bodies, and the system which oper-
ates in practice. Mr Justice Hope implied the usual
procedure should be that ASIO, through its Director-
General, would convey the relevant information to the
Prime Minister, who in turn would pass it on to the
Premier of tile State in question. There may, however,
be cases where the Director-General would be justified
in going direct to the Premier. 12 In fact the exchange of
information is far more low key, regular and even auto-
matic. Large volumes of often unsolicited data in the
form of card entries, dossiers, photographs, etc. is sent
by ASIO operatives direct to the Branch. Where ASIO
requests information of the Branch, it is usually (but
not always) done through a written form13 which is
authorised by the officer in charge of the Branch.
However, this does not account for informal transfers
by telephone and the like.
In every instance examined by the NSW Privacy Com-
mittee, of an exchange of information with ASIO, the
officer in charge completed the 'formality' of a direction
for the attention of the NSW Commissioner for Police,
as well as signing the authorisation on the Commission-
er's behalf. Thus the procedural safeguards governing
the transfer of information to ASIO did not in practice
have any effect. The reality was that the then Commis-
sioner, as he expressed to the author in a conversation
before the Privacy Committee's examination, had little
if any detailed knowledge of the nature and the extent
of the relationship between ASIO and Special Branch.,
The South Australian experience was similar with
respect to the ASIO connection. The interpretation by
Special Branch of 'domestic subversion' was heavily
influenced by external agencies, principally ASIO. White
emphasised the fact that unlike ASIO, but like the FBI,
Special Branches, by reason of their formation within
ordinary police forces, can call upon the resources and
carry out the functions of the ordinary police, if the
Commissioner so permits.14 The natural corollary of
this is that if the connection between ASIO and the
Branch was close, ASIO may use tile Branch as a conduit
through which they can actively promote their intelli-
gence-gathering activities without violating jurisdictional
barriers.
The White report concludes that the continued situ-
ation where a State Special Branch operates as a part of
the executive arm of ASIO, even by informal arrange-
ment, should cease. Perhaps the strongest argument for
this rests in the evidence that as ASIO works through a
State agency such as the Special Branch it may infringe
on the sovereignty of that State,and in its most basic
operations seems in no way directly accountable to the
elected Government of that State.
THE ASIO 'FRONT' PRIOR TO THE
'SEARY OPERATION'
In 1975 the NSW Police Commissioner gave a directive
to Special Branch which specified the relationship be-
tween ASIO and the NSW Special Branch. The Branch
was to convey information of 'national security' interest
obtained in the course of its other functions, to the
Regional Director of ASIO. In practice, as previously
discussed, the traffic of information between these two
agencies, went far beyond these limits.
To appreciate the extent of ASIO's influence in NSW,
through the offices of the Special Branch, is not an easy
task. The reciprocal transfer of information from the
Branch to ASIO is not constantly documented in Branch
files. No specific criteria have been laid down as to what
constitutes information of national security interest
which should be accumulated by the Branch and passed
on. It appeared during the Privacy Committee Inquiry,
that no assessment was made by the Branch of whether
requests by ASIO for information should be acceded to.
The request alone seemed to justify the presumption
that the data requested related to national security mat-
ters. Such requests were processed and responded to as
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a matter of course despite the nature of the standard
form reply which implied some decision on behalf of
the Commissioner having been made. Once information
was supplied to ASIO, the Branch may not have been
aware of its use nor did it have any control over the
access to this information allowed to third parties.
More than simply supplying ASIO with information and
relying on it for a vast amount of data which through
its limited resources it could not amass, the Special
Branch acted for ASIO in liaison with other State
agencies. When acting on ASIO's behalf the Special
Branch either overtly, or covertly, may have been the
only legitimate legal, administrative or operational
means through which ASIO could promote its interests
through all aspects of government. The Branch repre-
sented an official point of contact for most dealings
between ASIO and all aspects of the NSW police force.
Despite the fact that so little about the ASIO-
Special Branch connection has been committed to writ-
ing and that the nature and extent of the intial reliance
of one agency on the other is impossible to establish in
any complete sense, the following major conclusions
about the relationship can be drawn even from an under-
standing of the general file-keeping practices of the
Special Branch prior to and during the 'Seary Opera-
tion'.
I. Because of the disparity between the vast amount
of data being regularly entered and stored in the
Special Branch information systems and the size of
the operational staff in the Branch, one could only
conclude that a considerable proportion of this in-
formation emanated from a larger intelligence agency,
i.e. ASIO. For example the Special Branch alleged
that they took few if any photographic records for
their own purposes and yet the Branch's photography
index was very extensive.
2. Much of the data entered on Branch files was from
interstate and federal sources. This could only come
from other State Branches or from ASIO.
3. Much of the Branch's time and interest was spent on
monitoring political movements or organisations
which had presented threats to the security of other
governments besides NSW, e.g. the Branch had car-
ried out extensive monitoring of the Ananda Marga
in NSW after the kidnapping of the Indian Consul in
Canberra and well before any suggestion of their
involvement in subversion or terrorism in this State.
A large proportion of the information on the Ananda
Marga, held by the Branch had nothing to do with
NSW and had come from ASIO. To this extent ASIO
was directly influencing the emphasis attached by the
Branch to the activities of this organisation at large
and its consequent threat for NSW.
4. Because of' the ignorance which prevailed amongst
senior politicians and police officers in NSW concern-
ing the activities 6f the Special Branch, it seemed
obvious that the Branch was essentially servicing
agencies outside that State.
5. The principal function of the Branch was the gather-
ing of infonnation to counter subversion. As such it
concerned itself with the operation of national poli-
tical, trade union, ethnic and social action groups.
Its interest was not too much with the legitimate
interest of governments in NSW. It was more con-
cerned with monitoring the 'left' and extremist
right factions for the benefit of centr¢1 conservativ e
governments such as those traditionally in power in
the Federal sphere.
Thus the Special Branch in NSW as in other States dev,
eloped from its original connection with Commonwealth
intelligence agencies, as an executive arm of ASIO.
The potential for ASIO to extend its operations
within any State is increased when one considers the
involvement of the Special Branch in normal police
investigations. Through such involvement the Branch
has acquired information it considered relevant to sub-
version by dubious means involving the exercise of
police powers of arrest, search and seizure. The dangers
of abuse of power where a body responsible for collec-
tion of 'subversion' intelligence also has these police
powers are considerable. The dangers posed to the civil
rights of State citizens, when such information is con-
veyed to ASIO are obvious.
THE CASE AGAINST SPECIAL BRANCH
It is the autonomous operation of Special Branch (when
compared with other units within a disciplined force),
its symbiotic relationship with other non-police agencies
and its specific political/ideological motivation, which
makes it unique within the State's mechanics of social
control. As the 'Seary Operation' illustrates, its poten-
tial to achieve an orchestrated ideological victory in
terms of a particular police investigation is significant.
And through a combination of traditional police powers
and overt political intention it represents an essential
conduit through which the 'independent' process of
political intelligence is advanced.
However, has its present development strayed away
from original police concerns or is it rather a more sig-
nificant extension of the early police endeavour to
'control the dangerous classes'? As Silver16 argues, the
London police from their creation in 1829 were not
only conceived of as a repressive, coercive force - they
were also envisaged as a 'bureaucracy of official moral-
ity'.16 The police of the day had a mission against the
dangerous classes and political agitation in the form of
mobs and riots. Despite the objection to the first sugges-
tions of a centralised police force in Britain, it was the
success of the new police in suppressing such social
dissent that saw the police develop from a barely toler-
ated novelty to a part of the British tradition in a short
time.
Even if one accepts that police power also relies on
at least a minimal level of moral consensus and a per-
vasive moral assent, it cannot be denied that the func-
tional application of police power is at base political. In
almost every instance of its exercise, police discretion, if
not grounded in political considerations, produces a
'political' consequence. Even the essential decision of
selective enforcement infects modern police practice
with a political perspective.
In general, the continued existence of the Special
Branch seems assured by default. If its functions remain
ill-defined, then their relevance to society, their appro-
priateness to the civil police force and the manner in
which they are exercised cannot be criticised. Such
sources of internalised bureaucracy do, as the Scary
Operation indicates, influence other police activities.
Should the internal definition of police aims and respon.
sibilities develop along the lines of the Special Branch
model, then it will not be long before the transition of
the police from an agency of government to a govern-
ment within a government is complete.
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Fingerprint evidence
The Mickelberg stitch
Peter Wilsmore
The notion that a fingerprint is an 'unforgeable signature' has been exploded by allegations contained
in a book by Avon Lovell. The implications of the availability of technology to reproduce finger-
prints may call into question convictions obtained with such evidence.
Police throughout Australia have increasingly come
under the microscope in recent years as findings of
endemic corruption and malpractice proliferate.
(See, for example, the Beach and Norris Reports in
Victoria and Queensland's Lucas Report.) Now in
Western Australia, Avon Lovell has produced a sen-
sational expose of gross malpractice in The Mickel-
berg Stitch.
The major allegations in Lovell's book are that
police investigating the 1982 Perth Mint Swindle had
bashed their suspects, verballed them and then
forged a fingerprint to secure conviction.
Eight days after the book's publication last March,
Detective Anthony Lewandowski sought an injunction
to prevent further distribution pending the hearing of a
suit for defamation. The injunction was granted. A
series of applications and counter-applications saw
the ban on the book lifted and reimposed until on
17 May the book was again banned by Mr Justice
Pidgeon. 1
PRECEDENT OVERTURNED
Pidgeon J acknowledged the common law rule that a
deposition which stated the intention of the author
to show that the written words complained of are
true will, together with the public interest in free
speech,justify ajudicial refusal to grant an injunction. 2
Pidgeon J concluded, however, that because Lovell
'had no personal knowledge of the factsas to what
occurred in the police station' and 'the fact that a
[criminal] jury has already made a determination
[of criminal guilt]' the rule was neutralised.3
Adverting to the second base of the rule - public
interest - he said: 'it could not be said to be in the
public interest . .. for a convicted person [or his
agent] to make serious allegations against his inves-
tigators that they fabricated evidence [andl commit-
ted perjury . . . in respect of matters already consid-
ered by the jury that convicted him'. 4
On this basis Pidgeon J granted the injunction. It is
submitted that the judgment was incorrect. All too
often it is the investigative journalist making what
initially may appear to be outrageous allegations of
police malpractice who gives the impetus to final
proofs of such malpractice. To stifle the publication
of allegations about police malpractices as fully and
carefully documented as they have been by Lovell on
the grounds laid down by Pidgeon J is to give corrupt
and careless police full licence to continue their cor-
ruption and investigative carelessness.
INTEGRITY
The bases for Lovell's disclosure of police forgery of
Ray Mickelberg's fingerprint were the affidavits of
four highly reputable international fingerprint ex-
perts. 5 All four reported that the crime mark (on
the cheque) was consistent with a print obtained
from a rubber silicone finger and that it was incon-
sistent with an actual print made from Mickelberg's
finger.6
After an extensive investigation of their testimony,
including consultations with experts from the FBI,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, US Secret Service,
the British Home Office and New Scotland Yard,
Attorney-General Joe Berinson announced that King,
Thompson, Bonebrake and Olsen had resiled from
their affidavits. He also said that none of the other
authorities had found any evidence to suggest that
the print was other than a genuine fingerprint. 7
Berinson said that the allegation of forgery of Ray
Mickelberg's fingerprint 'was a most serious allegation
which went to the integrity of the West Australian
Police Force'. 8
When told of Attorney-General Berinson's state-
ment, King told the Western Mail's Martin Saxon:
'Any suggestion I may have changed my views is
arrant nonsense. I have given no authority for any law
officer in Australia to make any pronouncement to
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